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Introduction
This paper develops a model of marriage market equilibrium that can be used to analyze the
effects of age structure on marriage patterns. The model clarifies a number of issues in the literature
on the "two-sex problem" and the "marriage squeeze." Particular emphasis is placed on the age
difference between spouses as an equilibrating mechanism in marriage markets. The model follows
the spirit of Becker's application of the Koopmans-Beckman assignment model to marriage markets
(Becker, 1973, 1981). We derive conditions for the assignment of marriage partners among men and
women born in different cohorts and use the results to analyze the effects of fluctuations in cohort
size fluctuations on marriage markets. The results indicate that even large changes in cohort size
can be absorbed by relatively modest adjustments in the age difference between spouses, with no
necessary adjustments in the proportions of men and women marrying.
There is a large sociological literature on the "marriage squeeze," a reference to an imbalance
in the relative numbers of marriageable males and females.1 The fundamental force behind most
marriage squeezes is changes in cohort size over time. If marriages were always between men and
women of identical ages, changes in cohort size would have no effect on the relative supplies of
husbands and wives.2 Most populations are characterized by persistent systematic differences in
the ages of spouses, however, with men on average marrying women who are two to five years
younger. Studies for the U.S. over the last forty years, for example, regularly find that men are on
average two to three years older than their wives.3 Although the magnitude of this age difference
varies across countries and time periods, the tendency for men to marry younger women persists
across diverse demographic, economic, and social conditions. A study of 29 developing countries
by Casterline et al. (1986) found a persistent tendency for men to marry younger women. The
median difference between the age of husband and the age of wife was as high as 9.7 years and
never less than 2.5 years in the countries studied.
Given a persistent tendency for women to marry older men, cohort size fluctuations will upset
the balance in the marriage market. If there is a "baby boom," women from this large cohort
will, when they reach maturity, be seeking spouses from among the males in a much smaller
cohort. Simple arithmetic guarantees that not all women from the large cohort will find mates
from the smaller cohort from which their partners would normally be supplied. Some women could
be expected to postpone marriage, waiting for the males from their own large cohort to become
1 See, for example, Akers (1967), Schoen (1983, 1985), Goldman et al. (1984). For an economic analysis of
marriage squeeze effects see Ermisch (1981).
2 Discrepancies in the relative numbers could still arise through differential mortality rates between sexes, an
effect that has been argued to be an important determinant of black marriage patterns in the U.S. (Spanier
and Glick, 1980). Mortality differentials between men and women might vary over time due to changing health
conditions or wars, but they should not be directly related to changing sizes of birth cohorts.
3 See, for exaniple, Glick and Landau (1950), Presser (1975), Carter and Glick (1976), Atkinson and Glass (1985).
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available as potential partners. Others, unable to find a suitable partner at reasonable terms,
might choose to remain unmarried. The terms of marriage might also be expected to become less
favorable for the sex and cohort that is in excess supply, an effect emphasized in recent literature
by Heer and Grossbard-Schechtman (1981) and Guttentag and Secord (1983).
In the following sections we outline a theory of marriage assignments that can be applied to
test a number of hypotheses regarding the effects of age structure on marriage market outcomes.
No simple "mating function" can ever capture all properties of a general equilibrium marriage
market. Our model of marriage begins in the spirit of Becker's (1974, 1981) analogy between
marriage assignments and the linear programming assignment problem analyzed by Koopmans and
Beckman (1957). Primary emphasis is on assignments based on age (or cohort), the essential issue
in analyzing marriage squeeze effects.
Age Differences Between Spouses in Stable Populations
One of the fundamental issues to be analyzed in the model of marriage assignments developed
below is age differences between spouses and the extent to which those age differences are affected by
changes in age structure. A number of basic points regarding the role of the age difference between
spouses as an equilibrating mechanism in marriage markets can be demonstrated by analyzing a
stable population with a constant proportional age distribution.
Suppose that all men who marry do so at age am, all women who marry do so at age af,
the probability of survival to marriage age is pm(am) for males and pj(aj) for females, and the
probabilities of marriage for males and females conditional on survival are 7rm and rf respectively.
The proportions of male and female births who eventually marry is the product of the survival
probability and the conditional marriage probability, and will be denoted by m = rmpm(am) and
f = rypj(af).
If all of these probabilities are to hold in every period, then the fundamental marriage market
clearing condition is that in every period xrmM(am) = 7ry F(af), where M(a) and F(a) are the
number of males and females at age a. Equivalently, the condition is that msB-a,,, = f(1-s)Bt..,,
where s is the proportion.of births that are male and Bt is the number of births at time t. If we
assume a stable population growing at annual rate r, then Bt = Boe''t, and the marriage market
equilibrium condition is that in every period t
Two simple special cases are immediately evident from (2). If f = m, implying that the same
proportion of male and female births eventually marry, then either r = 0, in which case the age
difference between spouses is irrelevant, or am = af, in which case the population growth rate is
irrelevant. Note that m and f represent the product of the probability of surviving to the marriage
age for that sex and the probability of marriage conditional on survival. More generally, the
condition in (2) describes equilibrium values of the age difference between spouses am - af and the
population growth rate r that will sustain a given ratio of male and female marriage probabilities.
From (2) these can be found by simply noting that for am - a1 f 0, marriage market equilibrium
requires that
r=(am - ayf). 3
Figure 1 shows contours of constant f/m ratios as a function of r and am -a1 .
4 Not surprisingly,
the figure demonstrates that higher population growth rates require smaller age differences between
spouses in order to be sustained as equilibrium rates. The more interesting result demonstrated by
the figure is the large range of population growth rates that can be supported without any change
in marriage probabilities by varying the age gap between spouses. For example, when 99% as many
female births eventually marry as do male births, population growth rates from less than .5% up
to 4% can be supported as equilibrium rates by simply varying the age difference betwveen spouses
between .3 and 4 years.
While these results apply to stable populations, the ability of relatively modest variations in
the age gap between spouses to absorb substantial variations in population growth rates, with
no adjustment in the proportions of males and females marrying, has important implications for
short-run fluctuations in age structure as well. As will be demonstrated below, even large short-run
fluctuations in sex ratios can often be absorbed by relatively small variations in the age gap between
husbands and wives. This has important implications for the marriage squeeze, since it suggests
that changing sex ratios may have less dramatic effects on proportions marrying or the terms of
marriage than are often assumed.
The Linear Programming Assignment Algorithm and the Two-Sex Problem
A major puzzle in classical demography is the "two-sex problem." The problem is well set out in
papers by Keyfitz (1971), McFarland(1972), Mahsam (1974), Das Gupta (1974), Sanderson (1983),
Pollak (1986, 1987) and Caswell and Weeks (1986). These papers point out that "one-sex" models
of marriage and reproduction are not proper equilibrium models. The one-sex models attempt
to estimate future marriage patterns or birth patterns by projecting age-specific propensities of
! It is convenient to look at the ratio f/m, since one simple interpretation of it is the proportion of females that
could marry in equilibrium if all males were to marry. The empirically relevant case of am > af and r > 0
requires that m > f, so f will attain its upper bound in such cases when m = I.
msBger,, = f(1 - s)Bte-ra5 (1)




Contours of Constant Ratio of Males and Females Marrying As a
Function of Stable Population Growth Rate and Age Difference Between Spouses.






births per period from a marriage of an age i male to an age j female. The mating rule is a
function that determines the number of marriages of type i males to type j females for all i and
j as a function of the vector listing the numbers of males and females of each age and sex in the
population. Pollak shows that if these relationships remain constant over time and if the mating
rule follows certain natural conditions, the dynamical system so defined will converge to a constant
equilibrium growth rate, yielding a constant equilibrium age structure. Pollak imposes only certain
very general conditions on the mating function such as nonnegativity, homogeneity, continuity, and
that the number of persons of a given sex who marry must not exceed the number of persons of
that age and sex in the population.
Pollak's mating rule can be thought of as a "reduced form" description of the dependence on
the outcome of a marriage market on supplies and demands of the two sexes from various cohorts.
In this paper we look behind this reduced form by posing an explicit structure of payoffs to the
possible patterns of mating and to study the marriage market equilibrium under this structure.
In particular, we take advantage of an idea proposed by Becker (1973), who suggested that the
problem of finding an efficient and stable assignment of marriage partners can be usefully viewed
as an application of the linear programming assignment problem. If correct, this is very good news,
because the assignment problem is very well-studied and very nice to work with. There are efficient
algorithms for solution of empirical assignment problems. Furthermore there are elegant and simple
comparative statics for this model.
The assignment problem was originally devised as a model for the efficient assignment of
workers to jobs. For each worker, i, in job, j, there is a money value of output a, which could
be produced if worker i is assigned job j. The assignment problem solves for the assignment of
workers to jobs that maximizes the total value of output subject to the constraint that each worker
has only one job and each job is done by only one worker. The solution to the assignment problem
not only reveals an optimal assignment, but it also imputes "shadow prices" to each worker and
job in such a way that if each worker were paid his shadow price as a wage and each job received
its shadow price as a rent, the optimal assignment would be a competitive equilibrium..
The assignment problem would be a reasonable model of marriage if the "value" of a marriage
could be measured by a single number like money income. On the face of it, this seems an outrageous
simplification of what marriage is about. In a marriage there are many joint decisions to be made
about many matters that are far removed from money. There also may be substantial differences in
tastes, in skills, and in initial wealth between potential marriage partners. As it turns out, we have
been able to show that the complexity of interaction in a marriage can be quite well modeled by the
presence of a large number of shared public goods in the marriage. For a broad and interesting class
of preferences over public and private goods, it happens that there is "transferable utility". This
means that although many complex joint decisions must be reached about household public goods,
5
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a single sex to marry or to have children from earlier cohorts onto the population of that sex in
younger cohorts. One evident weakness of this approach is that the male one-sex models predict
different numbers of marriages and of births than do the female one-sex models. As economists,
we find it natural to think that this state of affairs calls for a general equilibrium model in which
the decisions of agents are rational responses to the "market" environment in which they find
themselves. In this case we are inclined to think about a marriage market in which supplies and
demands are equilibrated by adjustment in the terms of marriage. We would expect that persons
of the same sex would be substitute goods, with persons being closer substitutes the closer their
proximity in age.
Pollak (1986, 1987) has recently reformulated the "two-sex problem" by replacing the constant
age-specific fertility schedule of the classical theory with two more fundamental relationships. These
are a "birth matrix" and a "mating rule." The birth matrix postulates an expected number of
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the efficient amount of public goods in a marriage is determined independently of the distribution
of private goods within the marriage. When this is true, the assignment problem model of marriage
as proposed by Becker can be applied directly.'
We will discuss here the simplest model that is empirically implementable and yet rich enough
to capture much of the character of the marriage squeeze. Suppose that an individual's utility
depends only on his or her age at marriage and on consumption of private goods. Of course, if
any two people choose to marry each other, they must both marry on the same day. This effect
can be nicely modeled by treating the date of the wedding as a (local) public good, entering into
both of the potential partners' utility functions. The reason one's wedding date enters one's utility
function is because this date determines ones age of marriage.
Let A be person i's preferred age at marriage, and suppose that individual i has a quadratic
loss function for marrying at a less than ideal age. In particular, let C, be person i's consumption
of private goods, let Wi be the year of i's marriage and Bi the year of person i's birth. Then
A, =- W; - Bi is i's age at marriage. Let A be i's most preferred age of marriage. Then let i's
utility function be
Uj(A~,,,C) = C; - (A - A)
2
.
Written in terms of the wedding date and birth date, this can be equivalently expressed as
(4)
(5)
marry if they do marry is exactly half way between the favorite wedding date of i and the favorite
wedding date of j.
For example, suppose that male i was born in 1944 and female j was born in 1946. Suppose
that i's preferred age at marriage is 25 and j's preferred age at marriage is 21. Then i would prefer
to marry in 1969 and j would prefer to marry in 1967. The efficient time for this couple to marry
if they do marry would be in 1968. In this case, each person would be missing his or her favorite
age of marriage by one year. Because of the special utility function that we have assumed, the
model displays transferable utility. That is, for any two people i and j of opposite sexes, there is
a number A,, which is the total utility generated by an optimally timed marriage between i and
j. Persons i and j can divide this utility in any way that adds up to Aj by redistributing private
goods between them.
Suppose that all males preferred to marry at age A,. and that all females preferred to marry
at age A. Then, given the assumption of a quadratic loss function, we can find the payoff matrix
which reports the value A,, of a marriage between a cohort i male and a cohort j female. Given
any set of males and females by birth cohort we can solve a linear programming assignment to
assign the cohorts to each other in an optimal way. Not only does this give us a prediction of which
cohorts of males would marry which cohorts of females in equilibrium, but knowing which cohorts
marry, we also know when they marry. Thus we can generate a prediction of the ages at marriage
for each cohort.
Suppose, for example, that each person's utility function is of the form given in (5) and that
the ideal age at marriage is 24 for females and 26 for males. It follows that the payoff matrix for
marriages between males and females of particular cohorts will be of the form given in Figure 2:
One interesting implication of the example described by the payoff matrix in Figure 2 is that
the marriage market outcomes observed in equilibrium will give the appearance that individuals
care about the age of their spouse or about the age difference between themselves and their spouse
even though the example is constructed based on the assumption that individuals care only about
their own age at marriage. The payoffs shown in Figure 2 indicate that marriages in which husbands
are two years older than their wives are the "best" marriages in the sense that they provide the
maximum benefit to the couple. This occurs not because either spouse cares directly about the
age of their partner, however. It occurs because marriages of this type will allow both partners to
marry at their ideal age. Although a given individual is assumed to be indifferent between spouses
of different ages, given the terms of marriage, potential spouses of different ages will have different
optimal marriage dates. The male born in 1944 in the above example would be equally happy with
a wife born in 1950 or a wife born in 1946, as long as each was willing to marry him in 1968 and
give him equal levels of consumption C,. A female born in 1946, however, will view a 1968 marriage
much more attractively than will a female born in 1950. The working of the marriage market will
U,(W,B,C,) = C, - [(W, - Bj) - Ai ) = C; - (W - W;V) 2 .
where Wi = Bi + Ai indicates i's most preferred wedding date. Suppose now that male i and
female j are contemplating marriage. Their utility functions as given in (5) belong to the class
of utility functions shown by Bergstrom and Cornes (1983) to have the property that the optimal
choice of public goods is independent of how the private goods are distributed in the marriage.
Given these utility functions it is optimal for i and j to maximize joint utility, which given some
wedding date W,, will be
Uij = U, + Uj = Ci + C, - (Wi - W) 2 - (Wi, -W)2. (6)
Solving (6) for the optimal wedding date W;;, the first order condition is
-- = -2(W - W) - 2(W;;j -W ) = 0,
implying that W,, = (W; + W)/2. For these special functions, the optimal time for i and j to
A detailed description of how this works out can be found in Bergstrom (1986) and in Bergstrom and Cornes
(1983). See Lam (1988) for an application to the issue of assortative mating in marriage markets.
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Figure 2
Hypothetical Marriage Payoff Matrix.
Total Utility Cost of a Marriage Between Male Born in Year i
and Female Born in Year j Given Quadratic Loss Function and
Ideal Age at Marriage of 26 for Males and 24 for Females.
Female Birth Cohort j
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 ...
1940 -4 -1 0 -1 -4 -9
Male 1941 -9 -4 -1 0 -1 -4 ...
Birth 1942 -16 -9 -4 -1 0 -1 ...
Cohort i 1943 -25 -16 -9 -4 -1 0 ...
1944 -36 -25 -1 -9 -4 -1 ..-
1945 -49 -36 -25 -16 -9 -4 ...
produce a marriage between the 1944 man and 1946 woman with much greater probability than a
marriage between the 1944 man and the 1950 woman, even though the age of the spouse has no
direct effect on utility from the marriage.
The fact that equilibrium conditions in the marriage market lead to marriage assignments that
can be misinterpreted as indicating properties of underlying preferences is one of the important
lessons from modeling marriage markets in this way. Casterline, Williams, and McDonald (1986),
for example, observe that the joint frequency distribution of husbands' and wives' ages in the
countries studied indicates more concentration than would be observed if the same median difference
had been generated by random assignments. They interpret this as indicating that the observed
distribution results from a true preference for certain age differences, rather than simply from the
fact that men and women have different distributions of age at marriage. The example above
demonstrates that the outcomes they observe could in fact be generated entirely from difference
in ideal marriage ages between men and women, with no preference for the age difference between
spouses per se.
The procedure outlined above is too rigid and simple as described. For example, we can not
expect that everyone in the same cohort and sex will have the same preferred age at marriage. In-
deed the matrix of predicted assignments that we obtain by assuming identical preferences predicts
that there would be much less variety in the types of matching by age than actually occurs. We
propose a method for allowing some variation in "taste". While more elaborate methods could be
employed, this device has the virtue of being quite simple to calculate and to contemplate. Suppose
that there is variation in the "maturity" among people of the same calendar age. As potential mar-
riage partners, some 20 year olds may be the equivalent of the average 22 year old and some may
be the equivalent of an average 18 year old. This "maturity" that we are concerned with here could
be sexual or emotional maturity, but it could also be "economic maturity", in the sense of owning
enough assets to be ready for marriage. Let us suppose that there is an exponential distribution
of "maturity" around calendar age so that the probability that someone of calendar age A is of
maturity, M, is proportional to |A - M|-* where a is a parameter to be estimated.
For a given choice of a, given the distribution of calendar ages in the population at any time,
we can also calculate the distribution of the population by sex and maturity level at that time. If
we assume that marriage assignments take place according to maturity rather than simply to age,
we can follow the same procedure we outlined earlier to generate a prediction of the pattern of
marriages by maturity level rather than by age. Using a calculation based on Bayes' theorem, we
can determine the estimated matrix of marriage assignments by calendar age from the matrix of
assignments by maturity. The fundamental assumption that allows us to perform this "inversion"
is the assumption that one's choice of marriage partner and of date of marriage is determined only
by maturity levels, so that people of the same sex and maturity will distribute themselves in the
same way among marriage partners of the opposite sex even if their calendar ages differ.
We search over a range of the dispersion parameter, a, for the value that best fits the predictions
to the data. The greater the value of a, the greater will be the variation in preferred dates of
marriage among persons in the same cohort, and the more likely will be assignments of persons
of widely differing ages to each other. It is important to remember that our hypothesis is that
equilibrium adjustments take place according to the unobserved "maturity." Our strategy is to
hypothesize a variance of maturity around calendar age, to "fuzz" this data by assuming a value for
a, calculating the implied distribution of maturities and using this distribution and the assignment
algorithm to predict the distribution of marriages by maturity. Finally we invert the fuzzing
operation to deduce the predicted distribution of marriages by calendar ages implied by the value
of the parameter a and the predicted distribution of marriages by calendar ages. More elaborate
kinds variation in preferences over the population can be introduced by this same method. For
example, it may be that there is greater variation in maturity among people of a given age for
one sex or the other. Such elaborations can be introduced quite readily, using the same general
procedure we followed above.
Hypothesis Testing and Prediction in the Assignment of Marriage Partners
The interpretation of the "shadow prices" that are found in the assignment problem is especially
interesting in the application to marriage assignments. The assignment solution assigns a "price"
specific to each cohort and sex such that if the assignment problem assigns a male of cohort i to a
female of cohort j, then their respective shadow prices, p" and p1 just add up to the value A;1 of
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a marriage between them. Furthermore, neither member of the couple could get a higher payoff by
marrying a person from a different cohort, paying his or her price and retaining the residual value
from the contemplated alternative marriage. Thus the assignment problem not only is a theory
of who marries whom and when they marry, but it also contains a theory of the distribution of
benefits within marriages.
If someone belongs to a cohort whose shadow price is unusually low, then our theory suggests
that he or she will be offered less attractive terms of marriage than someone who belongs to a
cohort whose shadow price is high. As the terms at which a particular cohort and gender can
marry become become less attractive, one would expect that a smaller proportion of that group
would choose to marry. More specifically, it is reasonable to assume that there is a distribution
of "reservation prices" among members of each sex-cohort group. Those who are not offered their
reservation prices in marriage would choose to remain single. Keyfitz (1971) and others have tested
a number of essentially ad hoc matching formulas to see how well they predict actual marriage
rates. In similar fashion, we can test the predictions of the assignment problem to actual patterns
of marriage and compare its performance against that of other methods.
Cohort Size Fluctuations and Marriage Market Equilibrium
The assignment model outlined above can be used to test the effects of cohort size fluctuations
on marriage markets. Imagine a population that has been stationary for some time. If the ideal age
at marriage for males Am is two years higher than the ideal age at marriage for females A1 then an
efficient marriage market in a stationary population would always have men marrying women two
years younger. If we think of assigning cohorts of men to cohorts of women, the payoff matrix will
have maximal payoffs along the off-diagonal in which male cohorts are assigned to female cohorts
born two years later. According to the specification above, payoffs for less than ideal marriages
will drop off quadratically from this "ideal" off-diagonal, exactly as in the example in Figure 2.
Suppose that a long series of identical cohort sizes is interrupted by a temporary increase
in cohort sizes, followed by a decrease and eventual return to stationarity. Figure 3 shows such a
sequence of hypothetical birth cohort sizes for an initial "baby boom" or larger than normal cohorts
followed by a "baby bust" of smaller than normal cohorts. The sequence of cohort sizes relative
to an arbitrary (and irrelevant) equilibrium level are shown in the line labeled relative cohort size.
The cohort size fluctuations are generated by two six-year sine waves beginning in the tenth year,
followed by a return to stationarity. The largest cohort, born in year 13, is about 25% larger than
the mean, while the smallest cohort, born in year 19, is about 25% smaller than the mean. The
linear programming assignment model described above is used to assign husbands to wives for the
twenty-seven years of birth cohorts shown, based on the assumption that the ideal age at marriage
for males is three years older than the ideal age at marriage for females.
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Figure 3. Simulated Marriage Squeeze With Baby Boom Preceding Baby Bust
Relative Cohort Size, Sex Ratios, and Equilibrium Age Difference Between Husbands and Wives.
Marriage Assignments Based on Linear Programming Assignment Algorithm.
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Figure 4. Simulated Marriage Squeeze With Baby Bust Preceding Baby Boom
Relative Cohort Size, Sex Ratios, and Equilibrium Age Difference Between Husbands and Wives.
Marriage Assignments Based on Linear Programming Assignment Algorithm.
(Based on three year difference between ideal age at marriage for males and females.)
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The line marked with circles in Figure 3 shows the sex ratios implied by these cohort size
fluctuations, where the sex ratio shown is the ratio of males born in year t to females born in year
t + 3, the "ideal" partners .for the cohort. The ratio drops below unity in year 8 because the female
cohort in year 10 is the first of the larger than normal cohorts. The sex ratio fluctuates significantly,
ranging between .7 and 1.5 over the period of cohort size fluctuations.
Figure 3 also shows the average age difference between husbands and wives for each cohort
according to the marriage assignments made by our linear programming assignment algorithm when
there is a three year difference in the ideal age at marriage for men and women. All men and women
from each cohort are assigned a partner, so that none of the "marriage squeeze" shock indicated
by the changing sex ratios is absorbed by variations in proportions marrying. The series labeled
"Age Difference, Males(t)" shows the average age difference between men born in year t and their
wives. The series labeled "Age Difference, Females(t)" shows the average age difference' between
women born in year t and their husbands. These two series will in general not be identical in a
period of fluctuating sex ratios, and the dispersion in the two is of interest in its own right. For
now we concentrate on the basic patterns in common between the two series.
The most dramatic result shown in Figure 3 is that we are able to assign marriage partners to
all men and women from each cohort simply by varying the mean age difference between husbands
and wives between 2.3 and 4 years. In fact no couple every marries with an age difference that is
greater than 4 years or less than 2 years under the assignments implied by the linear program. The
stationary populations that precede and follow the cohort size fluctuations are characterized by all
couples having a three year age difference between spouses. As the first large female cohorts begin
to enter the marriage market some women are assigned to men only two years older. As the "baby
boom" reaches a peak in year 13, the need to assign women to men closer in age to themselves is
reduced and the age gap moves back toward three years. The subsequent "baby bust" leads to an
increase in the age gap as some women are assigned to men more than three years older. Eventually
the gap moves back to its stationary population level of three years as the cohort size fluctuations
subside.
The hypothetical sex ratio fluctuations generated in this exercise are in fact similar to those
observed in countries like the United States and Sweden in the last fifty years (see Bergstrom and
Lam, 1988). What the exercise demonstrates is that even dramatic fluctuations such as these can be
absorbed by the marriage market with no change in the proportions of men and women marrying
(in the example here 100% of the men and women in every cohort marry). The equilibrating
mechanism is the age difference between husbands and wives, with adjustments that are only an
average of .7 years lower and 1 year higher than the "ideal" age difference of 3 years capable of
absorbing all of the "marriage squeeze."
Figure 4 shows the mirror image series of cohort size fluctuations to those in Figure 3, with
the baby bust preceding the baby boom in this case. This case demonstrates that the relative ease
with which adjustments in the age difference between spouses accommodate sex ratio fluctuations
in Figure 3 are in no way driven by the fact that cohort sizes initially increase. An initial decrease in
cohort sizes can be absorbed in an analogous way, with the age difference between spouses initially
decreasing rather than increasing. The magnitudes of the adjustments required to absorb this baby
boom followed by a baby bust are exactly the same as those required to absorb the same level of
cohort size fluctuations in the opposite temporal sequence.
Two other simulations providing additional insights into how a marriage market can absorb
sex ratio fluctuations are shown in Figures 5 and 6. The example in Figure 5 shows a "one sided"
cohort size shock in which a baby bust occurs and simply returns to some equilibrium level rather
than being offset by a subsequent baby boom of above normal cohort sizes. In this case the sex
ratio rises to a peak in year 6 of about 1.25 males to every female born two years later and falls
to a low of about .7 males to every female born two years later. In this case a difference in the
ideal age at marriage for men and women of 2 years is assumed, and a 12 year sine wave of cohort
size fluctuations is assumed. As shown by the plots of the mean age differences in Figure 5, we
are once again able to assign every man a wife and every woman a husband by relatively modest
adjustments in the age difference between spouses. In this case the mean age difference rises to
3.25 years, 1.25 years over the "ideal difference" of 2 years, before returning to the steady state
level of 2 years. The mean of 3.25 occurs because some women are assigned husbands who are 4
years older at the trough of the baby bust.
Finally, Figure 6 considers the case of random cohort size fluctuations. The previous examples
are characterized by smooth systematic cohort size changes, and it is natural to suspect that
the orderliness these changes may make it easier for a marriage market assignment algorithm to
accomodate sex ratio fluctuations. In the case presented in Figure 6 cohort sizes are generated
as a random walk stochastic process, with each cohort equal in size to the previous cohort plus
some pure uncorrelated disturbance. The sequence of relative cohort sizes and resulting sex ratio
fluctuations are shown in the bottom two lines of the figure as before. The sex ratio fluctuates
fairly erratically, with a high of about 1.25 in years 5 and 12 and a low of about .7 in year 16. A
two year difference in the ideal ages at marriage is assumed. The graph of the mean age difference
between husbands and wives produced by our assignment algorithm is considerably smoother than
the sequence of cohort sizes or sex ratios. This is because the marriage market is "smoothing"
the erratic sex ratios across adjacent cohorts in assigning husbands and wives. As above we assign
every man a wife and every woman a husband, in this case with age adjustments that stay between
two and three years age difference. The mean age difference rises and falls twice over the fourteen
years of stochastic cohort sizes considered here, with noone every marrying a spouse more than
one year away from the ideal age difference. Although only one case of random walk cohort sizes
12 13
Figure 5. Simulated Marriage Squeeze With Long Baby Bust
Relative Cohort Size, Sex Ratios, and Equilibrium Age Difference Between Husbands and Wives.
Marriage Assignments Based on Linear Programming Assignment Algorithm.
(Based on two year difference between ideal age at marriage for males and females.)
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Figure 6. Simulated Marriage Squeeze With Random Cohort Size
Relative Cohort Size, Sex Ratios, and Equilibrium Age Difference Between Husbands and Wives.
Marriage Assignments Based on Linear Programming Assignment Algorithm.
(Based on two year difference between ideal age at marriage for males and females.)
is presented here, the example in Figure 6 is typical of the results of a large number of simulations
of this type. The equilibrium marriage market assignments always smooth out even wildly erratic
fluctuations in sex ratios, allowing us to assign all individuals to spouses who are very rarely more
than two years away from the ideal age difference.
The results summarize in Figures 3 to 6 indicate the value of analyzing marriage squeeze effects
in the context of a general equilibrium model of marriage markets. Viewed in isolation, a single
year's birth cohort can appear to be extremely disadvantaged in the marriage market. Returning
to the sex ratios in Figure 3 as a standard measure, for example, women in the most disadvantaged
cohort face only .7 males per woman when three year older men are viewed as the pool of potential
husbands. In fact, however, all of the women in this cohort are able to marry men that are either
two years older or three years older than themselves when the entire series of cohorts are assigned
partners. This implies a surprisingly modest effect of what at first glance is a very large marriage
squeeze when compared to marriage squeezes observed in actual populations. The analysis suggests
that the effects of sex ratio fluctuations of the type observed in recent decades may be less dramatic
than is typically expected.
By viewing the "marriage squeeze"as a general equilibrium assignment problem, we see that
what appear to be dramatic shocks to the sex ratio when viewed in isolation can be absorbed
relatively easily by the marriage market. The adjustment mechanism is the age difference between
husbands and wives, with adjustments in the mean age difference of only one year in either direc-
tion capable of absorbing cohort size fluctuations of the magnitude observed in recent decades in
industrialized populations. Further empirical research is required to determine whether the mar-
riage market in fact adjusts in this way. Our own empirical analysis of marriage markets in Sweden
(Bergstrom and Lam, 1988) suggests that both the direction and magnitude of adjustments in the
age difference between spouses are in fact consistent with the simple model we have used in this
paper. We expect that theoretical analysis using richer models of marriage market assignments,
combined with empirical analysis of actual marriage patterns, will shed further light on the in-
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